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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Dameniel Owens appeals following the district court's denial of his motion for
credit for time served. Mr. Owens asserts that the district court erred when it denied his
motion requesting credit for time served on all of his sentences. Mr. Owens asks that
this Court overrule State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351 (1981), which held that a person who
had served prejudgment incarceration on two charges, and who had received
consecutive sentences on those charges, could only receive credit for time served on
those two charges against one of the sentences.

Mr. Owens asks this Court to

reexamine its decision in Hoch in light of the principles of statutory analysis set forth in

Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-896 (2011), as
the Hoch Court unnecessarily went beyond the plain words of the statute and attempted
to construe legislative intent. Mr. Owens asks this Court to overrule Hoch and hold that
all presentencing time spent in jail should be credited against each sentence, regardless
of whether the sentences were later ordered to be served concurrently or consecutively.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On August 16, 2012, a Twin Falls County arrest warrant was issued for
Mr. Owens for seven counts of issuing a check with insufficient funds. (R., p.31.) He
was taken into custody on the warrant on August 24, 2012. (R., p.33.) On August 30,
2012, bond was posted in Mr. Owens' Twin Falls case. (R., p.2.) On October 1, 2012,
the surety bond on the Twin Falls case was exonerated and bond in that case was reset
at $100. (R., p.3.) The information in the Twin Falls case was subsequently amended,
charging Mr. Owens with four additional insufficient funds charges. (R., pp.103-110.)
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Owens pied guilty to eight counts of issuing a
check with insufficient funds.

(R., pp.111, 124.) On December 17, 2012, the district

court sentenced Mr. Owens to 15 months unified, with six months fixed, on each of the
eight counts.

(R., pp.167-175.)

The eight counts were ordered to be served

consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of ten years, with four years fixed.

(R.,

p.173.) 1 The district court entered a written judgment of conviction on December 17 or
18, 2012. 2 (R., pp.167-175.) The written judgment provided that, pursuant to I.C. § 18308, Mr. Owens' sentence on each count "shall run consecutive to each other." (R.,
p.173.)
On May 21, 2013, Mr. Owens filed a Motion for Credit for Time Served in which
he asserted that he should have received credit for all of the time served on each one of
the eight counts for which he was convicted.

(R., pp.203-205.)

Mr. Owens

acknowledged the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351
(1981 ), but nonetheless asked the district court to credit him on each of the eight
counts, for the time he spent in custody in prejudgment incarceration on all of the
charged offenses. (R., pp.203-205.)
On May 22, 2013, the district court denied Mr. Owens' motion without a hearing.
(R., pp.207-208.) On June 25, 2013, Mr. Owens filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the
district court's order denying his motion. (R., pp.211-214.)

1

The sentences were ordered consecutive to each other, but concurrent with Ada
County case number 2012-4404, a case in which Mr. Owens pied guilty to one count of
grand theft and was sentenced to fourteen years, with three years fixed. The sentence
in that case has been appealed in Idaho Supreme Court case number 40910.
2 An "Amended" judgment of conviction was filed on December 17, 2012, which did not
appear to substantively alter the original Judgment of Conviction other than to reduce
the amount of court costs ordered. (R., pp.176-183.)

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Owens' motion for credit for time served?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Owens' Motion For Credit For Time Served

A

Introduction
Mr. Owens asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for

credit for time served. First, although Mr. Owens' sentences on each count were
ordered to run consecutively, Mr. Owens nonetheless was in custody on numerous
counts and I.C. §18-309 is mandatory, specifying that a person shall receive credit.
Second, notwithstanding the Court's opinion in State v. Hoch, denying a defendant
credit for time he spent incarcerated on a charge is fundamentally unjust and unfair.
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Owens respectfully requests that this Court
overrule Hoch in light of the principles of statutory analysis set forth in Verska, and order
that Mr. Owens be given credit for time served on each of the eight counts.

B.

Standard Of Review
A determination as to "[w]hether the district court properly applied the law

governing credit for time served is a question of law over which" appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal,
the appellate court will "defer to the district court's findings of fact, however, unless
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record
and are therefore clearly erroneous." Id.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Owens' Request For Credit For
Time Served
Idaho Code Section 18-309 governs when credit must be given for both pre- and

post-judgment incarceration:
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In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the
judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any period
of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the
offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. The
remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of sentence
and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal means is
temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned
thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be computed as
part of such term.
(Emphasis added.) The language of I.C. § 18-309 entitles a defendant to credit for "any
period of incarceration" and, notably, does not base credit on any factor other than
actual incarceration "for the offense or an included offense."

The Idaho Court of

Appeals has explained, "[t]he directive of I.C. § 18-309 is mandatory, specifying that a
person shall receive credit." State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing

Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455 (1983)) (emphasis in original).
Further, the statute can be broken down into two temporal sections:

(1) what

credit a person shall receive for time spent incarcerated prior to the entry of judgment,
i.e., pre-judgment incarceration; and (2) how a person is credited with the remainder of
the term, which commences "upon the pronouncement of sentence," i.e., post-judgment
incarceration. This temporal break suggests that the credit is a separate issue for the
sentence later imposed. Additionally, to be able to deny credit for time served based on
the sentence imposed represents a retrospective adjustment of credit for time already
served. 3
In State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351 (1981), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a
person who had served prejudgment incarceration on two charges, and who had
received consecutive sentences on those charges, could only receive credit for time

This is significant in light of this Court's holding in State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664
(2010) (holding that if the trial court does not specify whether a sentence is to be served
concurrently with or consecutive to another sentence, the sentence will be concurrent).
3
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served on one of the sentences. Id. at 352. This was so because the Court found "no
intent of the legislature that a person so convicted should have that credit pyramided
simply because he was sentenced to consecutive terms for separate crimes." Id; see
also State v. Hernandez, 120 Idaho 785, 792 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that credit must
be allowed on only one of multiple consecutive sentences because conferring credit on
each of the consecutive sentences would give the defendant credit for more time than
he actually spent in confinement).
The totality of the Idaho Supreme Court's findings in Hoch were as follows:
A statute is to be construed in consideration of the reason for the statute,
its object and purpose and thereby ascertain and render effective the
legislative intent. We hold that the purpose of I.C. § 18-309 is clearly to
give a person convicted of a crime credit for such time as he may have
served prior to the actual sentencing upon conviction. We find no intent of
the legislature that a person so convicted should have that credit
pyramided simply because he was sentenced to consecutive terms for
separate crimes.
State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351, 352 (1981) (internal citations omitted).
Mr. Owens recognizes that State v. Hoch, and its progeny are controlling
precedent in this case, and under Hoch, Mr. Owens would not be entitled to prejudgment credit on all of the counts for which he was in custody.

Nonetheless,

Mr. Owens respectfully requests that this Court overrule Hoch in light of the principles of
statutory analysis set forth in Verska. The Court's decision in Hoch is in conflict with
previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court because the Court failed to correctly
analyze the statute at issue and it also failed to apply the rule of lenity.

6

1.

I.C. § 18-309 Is Not Ambiguous

Because the language of I.C. § 18-309 is plain and unambiguous, the Appellate
Court is required to give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory
construction.
A question of statutory interpretation is a question of law over which the Idaho
Supreme Court exercises free review.

State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689 (2004).

Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the Appellate Court must
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v.

Bumight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389 (Ct. App.
2000). "A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one
reasonable construction." Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho
889, 896 (2011) (quoting Porter v. Board of Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141
Idaho 11, 14 (2004)).

An unambiguous statute would have only one reasonable

interpretation; an alternative interpretation that is unreasonable would not make the
statute ambiguous.

Verska, 151 Idaho at 896. The language of the statute is to be

given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning.

Bumight, 132 Idaho at 659.

If the

language is clear and unambiguous, the Appellate Court does not need to look to
legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389.
Specifically at issue here is whether I.C. § 18-309 limits the type of sentence for
which a defendant may receive credit.
2.

Hoch Was Incorrectly Decided As The Statute Is Not Ambiguous

As Justice Bistline correctly observed, Idaho Code Section 18-309 is not
ambiguous and mandates that the defendant "shall" receive credit. Hoch, 102 Idaho at
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355. Justice Bistline noted that the Court may only go beyond the plain language of a
statute when the result is unreasonable or absurd. 4 Id. 102 Idaho at 355.
Idaho Code Section 18-309 provides, "[i]n computing the term of imprisonment,
the person against whom the judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment
for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for
the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered." The statute
provides for credit for a sentence, and does not limit that credit in any way or allow a
court not to credit a defendant in instances where the sentences are to be served
consecutively. Yet, the majority opinion in Hoch held:
[T]he purpose of I.C. § 18-309 is clearly to give a person convicted of a
crime credit for such time as he may have served prior to the actual
sentencing upon conviction. We find no intent of the legislature that a
person so convicted should have that credit pyramided simply because he
was sentenced to consecutive terms for separate crimes.

State v. Hoch, 102 Idaho 351, 352 (1981 ). However, As Justice Bistline stated in his
well-reasoned dissent:
The very purpose of I.C. § 18-309 and similar statutes throughout the
states is totally frustrated by the Court's unreasoning and illogical holding
today that pretrial incarceration time will only be applied to one of the two
or more charges upon which a defendant is held to answer and eventually
sentenced.

Id. at 354.
Mr. Owens asserts that the Court's decision in Hoch should be abrogated as the
reasoning set forth by the Court applies only in instances where the statute was
determined to be ambiguous. As Justice Bistline noted in his well-reasoned dissenting
opinion in Hoch, a defendant who has been sentenced on multiple counts receives a

4

Such is no longer the standard, as in 2011, this Court abrogated Idaho case law which
held that the Court could modify an unambiguous statute should it be palpably absurd or
produce absurd results when construed as written. Verska, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96.

8

separate sentence for each count.

As such, the statute should be applied to each

charge, as that is its "plainly worded intent." Hoch, 102 Idaho at 354. Justice Bistline
compared I.C. § 18-309 to a similarly worded New York statute, and noted that the
highest court in New York held that "[w]hen a prisoner is held under several charges, jail
time must be credited against all of them until there is a commencement of
imprisonment upon sentencing ... " Id. at 354 (quoting People v. Malcolm, 379 N.E.2d
156 (N.Y. 1978)). As such, the Hoch Court erred in holding that a person convicted of
separate crimes and sentenced to consecutive terms shall not receive credit to both
sentences for all pre-judgment incarceration.

3.

Alternatively, To The Extent There Is An Ambiguity Within The Statute,
Pursuant To The Rule Of Lenity, It Must Be Interpreted In Favor Of
Mr. Owens

In this case the statute is not ambiguous-there is only one reasonable
interpretation of the statute which is, based on the plain meaning of the language of the
statute, that consecutive time is not excepted from the statute's directive that the person
"shall receive credit for any period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment." Thus the
appellate court has no need to construe the statute by ascertaining the legislative intent.
This Court must simply follow the law as written.
In Verska, the Court held that "[i]f the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does
not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (internal
citation omitted).

When the Appellate Court must engage in statutory construction

because an ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give
effect to that intent. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646 (Ct. App. 2001 ). To ascertain
such intent, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the
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context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history.
State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577, 581 (Ct. App. 2012)
Idaho Code Section 18-309 is not ambiguous; however, should this Court
determine that more than one reasonable interpretation exists, the principle of lenity
applies, and the statute must be read such that the Court will conclude that Mr. Owens
is owed credit for the time spent in pre-judgment incarceration on all eight counts.
The United States Supreme Court spoke to the cannons for interpreting an
ambiguous statute in State v. Crandon, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). The Court stated:
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole
and its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard is
set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in
resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage. To the
extent that the language or history is uncertain, this 'time-honored
interpretive guideline' serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of
the boundaries of criminal conduct and the legislatures, not courts, define
criminal liability.
Id. at 1001-1002.

"[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be

resolved in favor of lenity." United States v. LeCoe, 936 F.2d 398, 402 (9th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811 (1971)). Although United States
Supreme Court precedent is not binding in Idaho, the Idaho Supreme Court has held
that "criminal statutes are to be construed strictly and in favor of the defendant."
State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365 (1996). Accordingly, Mr. Owens asserts that if it is
not clear whether or not the legislature intended to credit a defendant for all time spent
in custody prior to his entry of judgment, regardless of the consecutive or concurrent
nature of his sentences, this Court should read this statute in favor of Mr. Owens.
Mr. Owens asserts that, because the facts in the record show that he is entitled
to additional credit for time served on each count for which he received a sentence, the
10

district court erred when it denied his request for credit for time served.

This Court

should hold that Mr. Owens is entitled to credit for all of the time spent in custody in
each case.
Mr. Owens respectfully requests that this Court overrule the decision in Hoch and
find that Mr. Owens is entitled to additional credit for every sentence on which he was in
custody prior to his sentencing.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Owens respectfully requests that this Court
order that he be given credit against each sentence for all presentencing time spent in
jail.
DATED this 15th day of January, 2013.

ublic Defender
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